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Between positivism, 
narrativism and 
idealisation in 
Polish methodology 
of history
Krzysztof Brzechczyn
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
This paper has two main purposes. Its primary 
purpose is to present the reception of the dis-
cussion between positivism and narrativism in 
Polish methodology of history. A secondary one 
is to paraphrase, using the notion apparatus of 
the idealisational theory of science, the issue of 
the accuracy of explanation. The paper consists 
of six parts. In the first, Hempel’s deductive-
nomological (or covering law) model of expla-
nation is presented. In the second part, the main 
tenets and assumptions of the Poznań school 
of methodology are described. The emergence 
of this school at the end of the 1960s was one 
of the most important intellectual phenomena 
in the cultural history of postwar Poland. How-
ever, the influence of the Poznań school post-
poned the popularisation of narrativism in the 
Polish methodology of history. The third part 
analyses the manifold reasons for this delayed 
reception. The popularisation of narrativism 
was only possible in Poland after 1989 but it had 
primarily an imitative character. This outline of 
the cultural and scientific context allows Chris 
Lorenz’s proposals (on the problem of the ac-
curacy of explanation) to be put in a wider per-
spective (part four). Namely, this author de-
scribes “a theoretical historical debate” on the 
status of scientific laws and talks about a post-
positivistic approach to science represented by 
Nancy Cartwright. This approach was to intro-
duce new perspectives to the understanding 
of lawfulness. In the fifth part of the article, the 
main assumptions and tenets (for example, the 
modes of explanation) of another post-positiv-
istic approach to science, namely the idealisa-
tional theory of science, are presented and com-
pared with the Hempelian model of explanation. 
In the final part, Hempel’s explanatory sketch is 
paraphrased using the notion apparatus of the 
idealisational model of science which provides 
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a solution, within this theoretical framework, to the problem of the accuracy of explanation posed 
by Lorenz. 
I
Proposed by Carl G. Hempel, the deductive-nomological (or covering-law) model of explanation ini-
tiated a discussion about the status and peculiarities of explanation in history. According to Hempel: 
general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in natural sciences, that they form 
an indispensable instrument of historical research, and that they even constitute the common 
basis of various procedures which are often considered as characteristic of the social in con-
tradistinction to the natural sciences … In history no less in any other branch of empirical in-
quiry, scientific explanation can be achieved only by means of suitable general hypothesis, or 
by theories, which are bodies of systematically related hypotheses.1 
The deductive-nomological (or covering law) model of explanation consists of the explanandum, 
that is, the sentence that describes the phenomenon to be explained (the sentence, not the phe-
nomenon as such), and of the explanans, which contains explanatory sentences. The explanans 
consists of a description of the antecedent conditions and of sentences containing general laws. 
The model of explanation can be presented in the following way:2
C
1
, C
2
, …, C
n 
– sentences stating antecedent conditions
L
1
, L
2
, …, L
n 
– sentences containing general laws
E – sentence describing the phenomenon that is to be explained (explanandum)
The adequacy of this model of explanation depends on certain logical and empirical conditions. 
The explanandum must be logically deduced from the explanans. The explanans should contain a 
general law and description of the antecedent conditions. A scientific law should not contain proper 
names or temporal-spatial determinants. Both the sentences containing the general law, as well 
as those describing antecedent conditions, should be equipped with empirical content so that they 
can be tested by experiment or observation.3
In a discussion on Hempel’s proposal that lasted more than half a century, three general positions 
can be distinguished: assimilationism, autonomism and methodological revisionism.4 The follow-
ers of assimilationism admitted that the deductive-nomological model, obligatory in the natural 
sciences, can be applied to explanation in historiography, although they saw the necessity of small 
corrections and modifications to reflect some of the peculiarities of historiographical research. 
The followers of autonomism claimed that this model did not reflect historiographical research 
procedures at all. Historiography, they argued, is about the understanding and interpretation of 
historical facts rather than their explanation, in the sense adopted by the natural sciences. A mid-
dle position was taken by methodological revisionists, who proclaimed the necessity of retaining 
Hempel’s model but at the price of introducing a significant modification, so that the model would 
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reflect the specificity of historiographical research. However, none of the discussants questioned 
the adequacy of a Hempelian model of explanation with regards to natural science. Rather, a dis-
cussion was held on whether and how to apply the deductive-nomological model in the domain of 
historical sciences (or more widely, that is, in the humanities). 
II
However, the discussion in Poland on the status of the deductive-nomological model of explana-
tion in history took on different forms than in the Anglo–American and western world.5 After the 
second world war, Poland was dependent on the Soviet Union and became a member of the East-
ern bloc. During the Stalinist period (1948–1956), Marxism was imposed as an official ideology. The 
Poznań uprising of 28 June 1956 and civil protests that October brought about political reforms 
and certain level of cultural and political liberalisation. Isolation from the west was partially bro-
ken and Polish culture received more freedom to develop. After 1956, it was possible for different 
schools of Marxism, apart from the official dogmatic line, to emerge; other philosophical orienta-
tions also resurfaced. 
One such interpretation of Marxism was elaborated by the Poznań school of methodology, which 
emerged in late 1960. This scientific milieu gathered around Jerzy Kmita (1931–2012), Leszek 
Nowak (1943–2009) and Jerzy Topolski (1928–1998) and drew intellectual inspirations from three 
sources: analytical philosophy developed in the Warsaw–Lwów (Lviv) school of prewar Poland, 
Popperian hypotheticism and Marxism (especially Marx’ methodological ideas and some concep-
tion of historical and dialectical materialism).6 The combination of these three sources contributed 
to an original naturalistic but antipositivistic interpretation of Marxism and the establishment of a 
“full-blooded” research programme into the methodology of the humanities as well as the social 
and natural sciences. Its main features were naturalism, hypotheticism, essentialism, idealisation 
and rationalism. It was assumed that these same research methods should be employed in the 
sciences and humanities. Moreover, research practice and empirical observation are steered by 
hypotheses/theories or research problems that have been consciously put forward. Furthermore, 
it was supposed that the reality under investigation consists of both basic and secondary proper-
ties/factors and relationships. This differentiation justified a procedure of modelling, allowing the 
selection of basic dimensions of the investigated reality over the less important. In the humani-
ties, the specific research procedure was a humanistic interpretation and assumption of ration-
ality, which fulfils a similar role as that of law in a deductive-nomological model of explanation.7 
The Poznań school elaborated an alternative to the Hempel–Popper proposal for a research mod-
el in the natural sciences and humanities. One of the most important achievements of this intel-
lectual milieu was the idealisational theory of science.8 The main idea of this approach to science 
(more technical tenets of it will be presented in the fifth part, below) is the belief that a scientific 
theory is not a generalisation of facts or a deductive-hypothetical system but, rather, that it begins 
with a radical deformation of reality. In the first, most idealised, model of the theory, it is shown 
how the investigated phenomenon depends only on its principal factor. As a result, idealisational 
law has the form of a conditional statement. Its antecedent involves counterfactual assumptions, 
based on which factors recognised as secondary to a phenomenon under study are disregarded. 
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The successor of idealisational law presents dependency between the studied phenomenon and 
its principal factor(s). The resulting idealisational statement is, therefore, valid under the accepted 
idealising assumptions. The theory resembles more a caricature than photography, in that a car-
toonist omits certain features and magnifies other features which he or she deems characteristic. 
In this way, we can recognise the caricatured person. However, this analogy between theory and 
caricature should not be understood too literally. The cartoonist stops when s/he draws a carica-
ture. A scientist, on the other hand, progressively corrects this simple picture of a phenomenon 
dependent only on the principal factor. He waives idealising assumptions, excluding the influence 
of some secondary factors, and shows how factors that were ignored in the initial model modified 
basic dependencies. In this way, a scientific theory is built which is a hierarchy of models, approach-
ing more and more the complexity of the investigated phenomena. 
Besides Kmita and Nowak, the third founder of the Poznań school was Topolski, who originally 
extended and applied their concepts in the domain of methodology of history.9 Topolski’s most im-
portant achievement was the so-called “dynamic concept of the historical source”, the concept of 
an integral explanation and theory of historical narrative. According to Topolski, a historical source 
is an informational structure constituted by set of questions posed by the historian. These research 
questions depend on the methodological and theoretical knowledge of the historian steering the 
whole process of searching for source information. Therefore, one cannot talk about a fixed re-
liability of a historical source because its value depends on the questions posed by researchers. 
Topolski distinguished between what-questions and why-questions. The answer to the first kind 
of question leads to a reconstruction of past reality. The answer to the second kind leads to its ex-
planation. The Polish methodologist also presented an original concept of integral explanation that 
could grasp both the motivational structure of individuals and social (class) structures. The action 
of individuals is explained by an assumption of their rationality, whereas the deductive-nomological 
model is employed in an explanation of the dynamics of social structures.10 
The results of a historian’s research are presented in the form of a narrative which is a certain 
whole (he coined the term “historiographical picture”), consisting of idiographical as well as theo-
retical layers. The truth of the narrative depends on the theoretical layer, which contains laws, basic 
relationships and dependencies. Therefore, according to Topolski, “a proportionately greater share 
in a narrative (story) of true statements as compared with another narrative (story) does not guar-
antee a greater degree of truth of the former”.11 
III
The Poznań school’s naturalistic but antipositivistic research programme was formulated in oppo-
sition to Hempel’s neopositivism and Popper’s hypotheticism. However, a critical analysis of both 
these standpoints contributed to an increased reception and popularisation of these views in the 
domains of philosophy and methodology of history. Because one needs to know what one is criti-
cising or eventually critically develops, in Poland books by Hempel (Foundations of Science, 1968), 
Ernest Nagel (The Structure of Science, 1961, second edition 1970), and Karl Popper (Logic of Sci-
entific Discovery, 1977) were translated and published.12 However, this state of affairs delayed the 
reception of narrativism in Polish methodology in the humanities until the 1980s. Hayden White’s 
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Metahistory was unrecognised in Poland until the second half of the 1980s, with only a reference 
appearing in Topolski’s Teoria wiedzy historycznej (Theory of historical knowledge) in 1983.13 One 
of the first articles devoted to White’s work was by Jan Pomorski and appeared in 1986;14 whereas 
the first paper by White to be translated into Polish was published in 1989 in Pamiętnik Literacki.15 
The reasons for this delayed reception of narrativism were manifold. Primarily the formal language 
and logical notions used by Poznań school authors hampered the reception of this standpoint. The 
ideas of the narrativists were mostly expressed through a language devoid of technical notions, 
which was more similar to belles-lettres discourse and common language with its ambiguities 
and lack of precision.16
Another barrier was the meta-methodological differences. A narrativism identified with antinatu-
ralism does not undermine the adequacy of a positivistic model of explanation in the terrain of the 
natural sciences, but only questions its applicability to the humanities. According to White, histo-
rians “have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the 
sciences … History is no less a form of fiction than the novel is a form of historical representation.”17 
Meanwhile, the idealisational theory of science took up a stronger position, rejecting a positivis-
tic model of explanation in the natural sciences as well in the humanities. Instead, it proposed its 
own universal model of science, applicable in all its domains and disciplines. Because of this, the 
antinaturalistic critique of the Hempelian model was unconvincing and uninspiring for the authors 
working within the Poznań paradigm. 
Last but not least, political barriers should be mentioned. The antiscientism of narrativism under-
mined the meta-ideological position of Marxism. Its legitimisation was based on being a scientific 
ideology tout court. Although by the end of the 1980s Marxism was a dead ideology, people who 
held state positions due to Marxism were still active and they had considerable influence over 
scientific policy by being members of journal editorial boards and publishing house committees. 
The full popularisation of narrativism was then only possible in Poland after 1989. At that time, un-
der Ewa Domańska’s editorship, Hayden White’s collections of essays were published, as were 
Frank Ankersmit’s.18 However, one could risk a thesis that the dissemination of narrativistic works, 
analogously as an acquaintance with neopositivistic works, did not give rise to critical reflection on 
narrativism – comparable to the response to neopositivism. For example, Topolski’s book Jak się 
pisze i rozumie historię (How to write and understand history) is usually interpreted as a break with 
earlier phases of his intellectual development and not as a critique of the ideas of postmodern-
ism in history.19 In Poland, the uncritical reception and imitation of narrativism can be more com-
mon than the critical incorporation of its concepts into theoretical frameworks by authors. There 
are many reasons for this state of affairs. One of them is the lack of analytical tools (or, properly 
speaking, the lack of acquaintance with them) caused by the fragmentation of the Poznań school 
and a certain impoverishment of its intellectual proposals. It is a pity because these are tools that 
would allow for a paraphrasing of the tenets of narrativism in the language of the school.20 Ac-
cording to a deformational concept of culture proposed by Nowak, idealisation is only one certain 
type out of the whole family of deformational procedures that can be divided into strong and weak 
forms.21 Examples of strong deformational procedures are reduction and transcendentalisation, 
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while an example of weak deformational procedures is potentialisation (negative and positive). 
Let us assume that we have an initial object O, provided with a certain set of properties, which are 
characterised by a certain intensity. As a consequence of a transcendentalisation, object O’ is pro-
vided with certain additional properties which the initial object does not have. The contrary one is 
a reduction, which relies on depriving object O’’ of certain properties in comparison with the initial 
object. As a result of the use of positive potentialisation, the properties of object O’ are character-
ised by a greater intensity than the properties of the antecedent object O. The procedure of nega-
tive potentialisation, instead, eventuates in an object, the properties of which are characterised by 
a lesser intensity than the intensities of the antecedent object’s properties. 
Constructs which are created in different realms of culture are a result of using complex defor-
mational procedures. The idealisation used in science is a combination of reduction and negative 
potentialisation whereas fictionalisation, which is used in literature, is a combination of reduction 
and positive potentialisation. It allows for the question of whether history is closer to science or lit-
erature to be paraphrased in the following way: which deformational procedures find primary ap-
plication in history - idealisation or fictionalisation? 
Therefore, there is no gulf between science and literature or art because these domains of the hu-
man spirit use different deformational procedures requiring imagination and courageous think-
ing. This thesis puts another light on the narrativist critique of realism and objectivism in history, 
allowing for the limits of this standpoint to be highlighted. 
IV
The main message of Chris Lorenz’s Przekraczanie granic is the belief in the philosophical sig-
nificance of historical research, which historians and philosophers do not always realise. In con-
trast, the knowledge of philosophical tradition affects the research practice of historians and their 
methodological consciousness. However, as Lorenz recognises, a philosophical reflection on his-
tory should not be detached from the research behaviour of the historian. The point of departure 
of all philosophical reflection on this matter should be a consideration of what historians really do. 
The point of arrival, such an interpretation of historiographical activity, allows for a deepening of 
our knowledge about the historian’s craft. This message shapes the structure of the book. In the 
first part, Lorenz approaches the standpoint of Putnam’s internal realism, which can be seen as a 
third way in current philosophical reflections on history. It opposes, on the one hand, objectivistic 
(positivistic) standpoints, and, on the other, relativistic (postmodernism, radical versions of nar-
rativism) standpoints. The author’s own presupposed analytical categories are applied in the sec-
ond part of his book, where he analyses practices and discussions in historiography primarily in 
the German context.
In the chapter “Wiedza historyczna a prawa: rozdwojona historia” (Historical knowledge and laws: 
the dual history), Lorenz considers the problem of scientific laws in history. A significant dualism 
is revealed in this respect because, from the beginnings of history as a university discipline in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, two main orientations emerged: the first, the antinaturalistic 
approach, questioned the applicability of scientific laws in history; the second, the naturalistic ap-
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proach, postulated using the same methods from the natural sciences in the humanities. The au-
thor does not recognise that, in regards to this dispute, it is possible to apply the category of in-
tellectual conversion. Adherents of contradictory positions tacitly assumed a common, namely 
positivistic, understanding of scientific laws. Lorenz indeed notes that in the second half of the 
twentieth century the positivistic standpoint was undermined by the post-positivistic picture of sci-
entific laws in science. In this context, he mentioned Nancy Cartwright’s influential book How the 
Laws of Physics Lie?22 However, according to Lorenz, the post-positivistic approach to science did 
not exert an impact on the theoretical historical debate in the methodology of history.23 
V
However, it is worth analysing the issue of the applicability of scientific laws in the research prac-
tice of historians from a perspective of a post-positivistic understanding of science introduced by 
the Poznań school. Let us now turn to the main concepts of the idealisational theory of science. 
Idealisation: It is assumed that a number of factors influence the phenomenon under investigation. 
These can be divided into main and secondary factors. It is assumed by virtue of the idealising as-
sumption p(x) = 0 that when the factor p equals zero it does not influence the phenomenon. Then 
one determines the way the phenomenon (F) depends on its main factor H. An idealisation state-
ment takes the form of a conditional clause: in its antecedent there are counterfactual assump-
tions according to which no secondary factors exert any influence on the phenomenon under in-
vestigation. And in succession to this conditional clause, the way in which the phenomenon under 
investigation depends on its main factor H is shown. Graphically it is presented in the following way:
(1) U(x) & p
k
(x) = 0 … & p
1
(x) = 0 → F(x) = f
k
 (H(x))
Concretisation: The procedure consists in the gradual lifting of previously made idealising assump-
tions and introducing appropriate corrections to the initial formula of a statement. Through this pro-
cedure, one can see the way in which the phenomenon under investigation depends on secondary 
factors. Concretisation is complete when the factual statement in which there are no idealising as-
sumptions is formulated.
(2) U(x) & p
k
(x) ≠ 0 … & p
1
(x) ≠ 0 → F(x) = f
1
 (H(x), p
k
(x) p
1
(x))
Approximation: In the research practice, final concretisation is never performed. The approxima-
tion of idealisational law relies on a waiving of all idealising assumptions and attributing a certain 
value to remaining secondary factors. This value a
1
 is different from a minimal value of the sec-
ondary factor that is allocated to it in idealising assumptions and from the actual values adopted 
by it. However, this value should not exceed a certain threshold of accuracy ε accepted in a given 
science at a given time. 
(3) U(x) & p
k
(x) ≠ 0 … & p
1
(x) ≤ a
1
 → F(x) ≈ε f0 (H(x), pk(x) p1(x))
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Explanation: An explanation of a given phenomenon consists of showing the dependence of the 
object under investigation on what is seen as the main factor for it. Then, from an idealisation law 
formulated in such a way, one derives increasingly realistic concretisations, which result in a for-
mulation of a factual statement. The sentence being explained results from a factual (or approx-
imative) statement and from its antecedent conditions, formulated on the basis of the procedure 
of concretisation.
(4) Tk ┤Tk-1 ┤T0 (or ╢AS) and P → E
Where ┤ is the relation of concretisation; ╢ the relation of approximation; P the antecedent condi-
tions; → the relation of derivation; E the statement to be explained; Tk, Tk-1, T0 the sequence of 
idealisations statements; the upper index points the number of idealising assumptions; T0 the fac-
tual statement; and AS the approximation statement. 
Such an understanding of scientific laws introduced new perspectives to the “theoretical historical 
debate”, as Lorenz describes. As he says, this way of understanding the status of scientific laws 
has not received serious reception, yet it is worth presenting the assumptions of an idealisational 
understanding of science and their application in historiography. I would like here to juxtapose a 
Hempelian–Popperian scheme of explanation with an idealisational scheme. In the Hempelian–
Popperian tradition: 
– laws are inductive generalisations of historical facts or a set of factual hypothesis yielding a 
complex mechanism of historical development, and 
– from such understood laws and antecedent conditions, the explanation of particular histori-
cal facts is derived.
The scheme of deductive-nomological explanation can be presented in the following way: 
(5) L and P → E
Where L is general law; P, the antecedent conditions; E, the statement describing the empirical 
phenomenon to be explained; and →, the relation of derivation. 
According to Hempel, a deductive-nomological model of explanation can be applied directly to re-
ality. Any discrepancies between the value of empirical data and the result, derived from the model 
of explanation, lead to its rejection. However, as Hempel recognises, in scientific practice histori-
ans recall an explanation sketch which consists of an indication of the scientific law and antecedent 
conditions that are considered relevant to a given phenomenon. An explanation sketch requires 
further “filling out” to be transformed into a “full-blooded” explanation. The explanation sketch sug-
gests only the direction that such a filling out should take.24 
In the idealisational approach, the explanation should present dependency (in the form of a condi-
tional statement) between the phenomenon F and principle for it, factor H. Such a formulated ide-
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alisational law is concretised; this procedure relies on a gradual waving of idealising assumptions 
made previously and presenting the modified dependencies between the investigated phenome-
non and principal, as well as secondary, factors. Concretisation ends with cancelling all idealising 
assumptions and drawing up a factual statement. The statement to be explained is derived from 
the factual statement and antecedent conditions. 
This scheme of explanation may be illustrated in the following way: 
(6) Tk ┤ Tk-1, ┤ . . . ┤ T1, ┤ T0 and P → E
Where ┤ is the relation of concretisation; P, the antecedent conditions; →, the relation of derivation; 
E, the statement to be explained; Tk, Tk-1, ..., T1, T0, the sequence of idealisations statements; the 
upper index points the number of idealising assumptions; and T0, the factual statement. 
In the idealisational theory of science, it is assumed that a scientist knows the mode of influence of 
each secondary factor on the investigated phenomenon.25 When we reject this assumption, it ap-
pears that a scientist does not know how all the factors influence the investigated phenomenon. In 
this situation, the scientist concretises the idealisational statement by showing the impact of these 
secondary factors, which s/he knows how they influence the investigated phenomenon, and estab-
lishes through approximation the influence of the remaining secondary factors, which s/he does 
not know how they influence the investigated phenomenon.
The approximation of idealisational law relies on a waiving of all idealising assumptions at once 
and attributing certain values to remaining secondary factors. These values are different from the 
minimal values of the secondary factors that are allocated to them in idealising assumptions and 
from the actual values adopted by them. An approximation statement is accepted when the level 
of discrepancies between empirical data and the result derived from theoretical formula does not 
exceed what is generally accepted (defined more or less intuitively by the threshold of approxi-
mation) in a given domain of science at a given time. The use of approximation in a procedure of 
explanation means that “not the given F-fact but a class of F-facts, defined by the threshold of ap-
proximation, can be derived from such a structure”.26 This scheme of explanation may be illustrat-
ed in the following way: 
(7) Tk ┤ Tk-1, ┤ . . . ┤ T1, ╢ AS and P → E
Where ┤ is the relation of concretisation; ╢ the relation of approximation; P, the antecedent condi-
tions; →, the relation of derivation; E, the statement to be explained; Tk, Tk-1, ..., T1, the sequence 
of idealisational statements; the upper index points the number of idealising assumptions; and AS, 
the approximation statement. 
VI
Let us consider now whether the explanatory sketch, proposed by Hempel, can be paraphrased 
using the notion apparatus of the idealisational theory of science. Let us remember that the scien-
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tist divides secondary factors into two groups. Belonging to the first group are those factors that 
s/he is able to enlist and knows their mode of influence on the investigated phenomenon. In the 
second group are those factors that s/he is able to enlist but does not know how they influence 
the investigated phenomenon. Therefore, the idealisational statement is concretised in regards to 
an influence of factors belonging to the first group. Approximation of the idealisational statement 
proceeds in regards to the influence of the factors from the second group. 
However this is not always true in scientific practice. One can accept a more realistic assumption 
and, according to this, our scientist also approximates the idealisational statement in regards to 
the impact of enlisted factors s/he knows influence the investigated phenomenon, but for different 
reasons (time, research purpose, own abilities etc) s/he is not able to concretise an idealisational 
statement. Therefore, our scientist divides secondary factors into three groups, namely those that: 
(i) concretise an idealisational statement with regards to the impact of only some secondary 
factors, where s/he knows how they influence the investigated phenomenon;
(ii) approximate an idealisational statement with regards to the influence of the secondary fac-
tors, where s/he does not know how they influence the investigated phenomenon; 
(iii) approximate an idealisational statement with regards to the influence of the remaining sec-
ondary factors, although s/he knows how they influence the investigated phenomenon. 
In this way, Hempel’s explanatory sketch may be paraphrased in the notion apparatus of the ide-
alisational theory of science. The “filling out” of the explanatory sketch relies on the continuation of 
concretisation in regards to the impact of secondary factors belonging to the third group. From the 
explanatory sketch, a wider class of facts than in the case of standard approximation can be de-
rived. However, this is done at the expense of the accuracy of the explanation. 
This idealisational status of scientific laws is maybe one of the reasons for their rare application in 
the research practice of historians. It is so because: 
– the basic subject of the historian’s research interest is, firstly, the reconstruction of historical 
facts or certain part of past reality and secondly, their explanation; 
– the idealisational model of explanation cannot be directly applied to reality besides in classi-
cal cases where the influence of secondary factors is suspended; 
– if historians resort to any theory (or scientific law), they are interested in the explanation of 
particular and usually unique historical facts, whereas the idealisational model of explanation 
allows the explanation of facts belonging to a given class; 
– the application of a given idealisational law to the explanation of particular historical facts re-
quires the building (by a process of concretisation and approximation) of a whole chain of ide-
alisational statements, which usually goes beyond the competencies and, more importantly, 
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the interests of historians who – due to the division of scientific work – are consumers rather 
than producers of scientific laws. 
Recalling an example given by Lorenz, the historian is not interested in an explanation of why bot-
tles filled with water cracked during subzero temperatures at night but why one of the bottles was 
cracked on the bottom and another one on the neck.
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